INTRODUCTION
Lockups prevent firms' insiders from selling whole or some percentage of their equity during post-IPO periods. Existing literature shows that the majority of US and UK firms go public with voluntary lockups (Espenlaub et al., 2001; Field and Hanka, 2001; Mohan and Chen, 2001; Hoque, 2011) and tends to focus on roles of lockups and their price effect around expiry dates (Brav and Gompers, 2003; Brau et al., 2004; Arthurs et al., 2009; Yung and Zender, 2010) . Although IPOs' survival has been studied before Kini, 2000, 2008) , the association of the survival and characteristics of lockups has not received attention in the past. 1 We extend the literature by studying the relationship between lockup length and long term performance (i.e., survival) of 580 IPOs from the London Stock Exchange's (LSE) Main Market, during the period of January 1990 to December 2011. The innovative aspect of our study is also a separate examination of longevity and probability of post-IPO failure. The importance of length of lockup periods for the probability of survival was examined using an Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) survival model. We further make a distinction between "positive" (e.g., mergers and acquisitions) and "negative" (e.g., failures) reasons for delistings and control for alternative signalling mechanisms utilized by IPO firms.
The examination of the relationship between lockups and survival for IPOs from the LSE Main Market is important for several reasons. First, the LSE is the leading European and one of the world's largest stock markets.
2 Second, in contrast to some markets such as France, Germany (Goergen et al., 2006a) and Singapore (Chong and Ho, 2007) lockups are completely voluntary for Main Market IPOs. 3 The LSE Main Market, therefore, provides an excellent setting for testing the relationship between lockups and firm survival which might not have been relevant in the case of countries/markets with compulsory lockups. Third, lockups for LSE IPOs are quite diverse and heterogeneous particularly in terms of their length. For example, Espenlaub et al. (2001) report average lockup length of 561 days whilst Hoque (2011) reports variation from 383 to 714 days for UK IPOs. This is in sharp contrast to the US findings of standardised lockups of 180 days (Field and Hanka, 2001; Brav and Gompers, 2003; Brau et al., 2004; Yung and Zender, 2010) . The diversity of lockup length in Main Market IPOs allows us to examine the role of lockups in IPO survival which would not have been possible in markets with short and/or standardised lockups. Fourth, recent government (Kay, 2012) and industry (BBC, 2013; Deloitte, 2013) reports expressed concerns regarding short-termism of UK listed companies. The alleged short-termism fails to create incentives for long-term performance improvements. Kay (2012) , for example, recommends that directors' remuneration should be linked to long-term performance and incentives should be provided in the form of company shares lockedin until director's retirement. More recently, some of the leading institutional investors in European companies argue in favour of lengthening incentive schemes in order to promote the companies' investments and prevent short-termism. 4 Examination of the relationship between various incentive schemes and longevity is thus important for informing the above debate.
We argue that the length of lockup at the time of going public has the potential to influence the post-issue survival as a listed company. Longer lockups expose firms' insiders to significant illiquidity and non-diversification costs in the post-IPO period. Consequently, only insiders of better quality firms with strong survival prospects will be willing to commit to longer lockups whilst insiders in low quality firms will avoid lengthy lockups. In addition, lockups force "insiders to not only put their money where their mouth is but to keep it there as well" (Brau et al., 2005) . In this way, lockups work 2 In 2005, LSE saw 354 IPOs with offering value of €18.6 billion. This was more than the combined volume of all US exchanges in the same year. See PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006) . 3 In the LSE's Alternative Investment Market (AIM), lockups have been compulsory for certain IPO firms since 2000. For example, IPO firms on AIM which have not been independent and/or have not reported earning revenues for at least 2 years are required to have 1 year lockups for related directors, substantial shareholders and their associates and employees (AIM Rule 7). 4 For example, Fidelity Worldwide Investment announced that it would start voting against management compensation plans unless companies' executives would commit to hold shares longer than 3 years before cashing them in (BBC, 24th September 2013) .
as a commitment mechanism to reduce agency problems and managerial incentives of shirking and consumption, leading to increased firm performance and survival in the aftermarket. Hence, longer lockups are likely to positively affect the survival of IPOs. Our analysis is related to Bharath and Dittmar (2010) who find that some of the variables (available at the time of IPOs) can predict which firms are more likely to go private.
Our results suggest an increasing popularity of lockups with clearly defined lockup periods in terms of a calendar date, rather than in relation to various corporate events. The sample IPO lockup periods range from 2 to 41 months with a mean (median) of 15.39 (13) months. The median sample IPO survival period was 92 months, with 69% surviving for at least 5 years. Our analysis highlights the importance of the length of lockup periods for the survival of issuing firms. For example, a 12 month increase in median lockup period increases the (median) survival period by 24 months. The results of our survival model confirm positive and statistically significant association of the survival rates and lockup period. Overall, the results of our study are in line with the recent calls from both regulators and investment industry for lengthier incentive schemes.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we provide a summary of the related literature and develop hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. Section 4 presents results of the survival analysis. In section 5, we test for robustness of our results and perform some further analysis. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES

(i) Lockups and Survival
The extant literature on the motivations for use of lockups suggests that lockups signal issuing firm's quality and serve as a "commitment device" (Brav and Gompers, 2003; Brau et al., 2005; Goergen et al., 2006b) . For example, lockup puts a penalty on inside managers for hiding negative information about firm value and serves as a bonding mechanism to regulate the actions of insiders. High quality firms with better growth prospects and survival may not find longer lockup periods problematic. On the other hand, firms with marginal prospects and low quality may not afford to have such longer lockups because their poor quality will be revealed during that period before the insiders can cash out. Brav and Gompers (2003) and Yung and Zender (2010) , for example, suggest that better quality US firms are likely to accept longer lockups to alleviate the problem of moral hazard subsequent to the IPO. Similarly, Arthurs et al. (2009) suggest that lockup periods tend to be used when other quality signals (e.g., venture capital (VC) backing, more reputable sponsors, etc.) are not available. In addition to the signalling effect, the longer length of the lockup period may be beneficial for strategic managerial decisions (e.g., extent of R&D spending, capital expenditure, advertising and expansion) made during the early post-IPO period (Jain and Kini, 2009; Chandy and Sivasubramaniam, 2011) . The above decisions ultimately affect the performance and the survival of IPOs in the long run. Thus, we expect a positive association of IPOs' survival and length of lockup period.
(ii) Alternative Signalling Mechanisms
The previous US evidence suggests a positive role of VC backing (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Jain and Kini, 2000) , underwriters' reputation (Carter and Manaster, 1990; Bhattacharya et al., 2013) and initial returns (Schultz, 1993; Hensler et al., 1997; Demers and Joos, 2007) on the subsequent performance and survival of IPO firms. Studies on UK IPOs, however, have largely failed to find significant differences between private equity (PE) and non-PE backed IPOs in terms of their post-issue performance (Jelic et al., 2005; Coakley et al., 2007; Jelic and Wright, 2011; Espenlaub et al., 2012) . Espenlaub et al. (2012) fail to find significant impact of initial returns on survival of AIM IPOs but report that IPOs sponsored by reputed Nomads (sponsors) on the UK's Alternative Investment Market (AIM) survive longer compared to those backed by other Nomads.
Evidence regarding impact of insider ownership on post-issue performance and survival of IPOs is also mixed. Consistent with Leland and Pyle's (1977) prediction, Jain and Kini (1994) find a positive relationship between managerial ownership retention and post-issue operating performance. Similarly, Hensler et al. (1997) and Jain and Kini (2008) find a positive impact of higher insider ownership on survival of US IPOs. Goergen and Renneboog (2007) , howevever, conclude that long-term performance of IPOs is not correlated with UK IPOs' retained ownership. Overall, the evidence on the importance of alternative signalling mechanisms on IPO survival is inconclusive. Their association with the IPO survival will be, therefore, determined empirically.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
(i) Data and Sample Construction
Panel A, of Table 1 , describes the filters we use to construct our final sample of IPOs. For example, we exclude investment trusts, venture capital trusts (VCTs), privatisations, re-admissions, non-UK firms and firms with missing data and IPO prospectuses. The above exercise resulted in 580 IPOs from the LSE Official List between January 1990 and December 2006.
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As noted earlier, survival as an independent public listed company (PLC) is a necessary condition of success for firms that went public in order to finance their growth prospects. 6 Being public enhances both the credibility and reputation of a firm and improves its ability to hire key managers through incentives such as stock options (Bancel and Mittoo, 2009) . Similarly, other stakeholders (e.g. board members and executives, underwriters, auditors, brokers, legal advisors etc.) have their interests linked with the continued listing of a firm on the stock market (Espenlaub et al., 2012) . We, therefore, define survivors as IPO firms which remain listed on the stock Table 1 Sample Selection and Definitions of the Variables 
IPO Prospectus, PI Navigator
Size
Size is the market capitalisation at the offer price in £ millions.
London Stock Exchange, IPO Prospectus
Age Age has been calculated as the difference (in years) between the date of IPO and the date the company was founded. Age is in years rounded up to the next highest full year.
IPO prospectus
Initial Returns
First day closing price minus offer price divided by the offer price; in percentages.
London Stock Exchange, Datastream
Insider Ownership
Insider (directors and officers) ownership at the time of IPO; in percentages.
IPO Prospectus
Sponsor Reputation
The sponsor reputation is measured as the number of IPOs sponsored by a sponsor as a percentage of the total number of IPOs during the year prior to the IPO year, following Goergen et al. (2006a) and Espenlaub et al. (2012) .
London Stock Exchange, IPO Prospectus 
IPO Prospectus
Hot Issue Returns
Average initial returns to all IPOs issued during the 3 months prior to the month of IPO, following Espenlaub et al. (2012) .
London Stock Exchange
Leverage
Total liabilities divided by the sum of total assets and issue proceeds at the date of IPO, following Demers and Joos (2007) . exchange as long as the benefits of listing are greater than the cost of remaining listed.
IPO Prospectus
Survtime
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When costs outweigh the benefits, firms can completely delist (i.e., go private) and become private thus expecting lower costs (Bharath and Dittmar, 2010) . Going private firms were classified as non-survivors and included in the sub-sample of acquired companies. 8 Another possibility for UK IPOs, in cases where costs outweigh the benefits, is to transfer to the second tier market with the ability to raise additional capital at significantly lower costs.
9 Consistent with previous literature (Espenlaub et al., 2012 , Vismara et al., 2012 these firms are classified as survivors.
Based on the above criteria, we established and traced survival of our sample IPOs up to December 2011. The dates and reasons of delisting of IPOs are obtained from the London Share Price Database (LSPD). The dates and delisting reasons of sample IPOs are further cross-referenced with the Perfect Filings database. We hand collect the following variable directly from IPO prospectuses: lockup information, sponsors, insider ownership, incorporation date, market capitalisation, industry and private equity (PE) or VC backing. For relative expiry lockups, we use Perfect Filings to find the corporate announcement dates and the exact lockup expiry. 10 The data for initial returns are obtained from Datastream. All variables are defined in Panel B of Table 1 . Table 2 presents sample descriptive statistics. Out of the sample IPOs, 517 (89%) have lockups in place for at least one class of shareholder. The average lockup period of the sample IPOs is 15.39 months (468 days), measured as number of 7 We acknowledge that survival as a public company might not be the ultimate aim of firms going public. IPOs may represent the first stage in the sale of a firm by establishing the market value of shares. Firms also engage in IPO with a view to being taken over (Zingales, 1995) . However, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to infer the intent to sell from at the time of listing. What is directly observable, however, are the reasons for listings stated in IPO prospectuses. The majority of firms, for example, state that the main reason for listing is to raise money (Kim and Weisbach, 2008) which is consistent with our definition of survival (i.e., continued listing).Unreported results suggest (as expected) that the ability to raise new capital was the most frequently stated reason for listings in IPO prospectuses. 8 Going private transactions are normally completed via management buy-outs, tender offers and acquisitions by financial institutions (see Borden and Yunis, 2007) . Treating mergers and acquisitions as nonsurvivors is consistent with previous literature (see Jain and Kini, 2000) . 9 In the US, firms would have yet another choice. For example, they can also exit mandatory disclosure while continue to be publicly traded (i.e., go dark) (see Leuz et al., 2008) . 10 In case of relative lockup expiry, the expiry date of lockup is specified in relation to other company events like announcement of results, publication of accounts etc. (Espenlaub et al., 2001) . months from IPO date until the lockup expiry date. The lockup length, however, varies considerably among sample firms with a minimum lockup of 2 months and a maximum of 41 months. This clearly shows the large diversity and non-standardisation of lockup length among the UK issuers. The average size (market capitalisation) of IPO firms at the time of listing is £259.16 million. There is also a large variation in terms of the market capitalisation of IPOs with a minimum of just £1.05 million and a maximum of £7,725 million. Firms list with an average age of 17.36 years at the time of IPO.
11 The issuing firms exhibit average initial returns of 11.18% during the sample period. The sample firms go public with insiders holding an average (median) of 24.71% (19.79%) of the post-IPO equity stakes. The average sponsor market share as a percentage of total sponsorship by IPO numbers is 2.99% with a maximum of 15.38%. More than half (51.4%) of the IPO firms are backed by PE or VC. The average initial return of all the IPOs in the 3 months prior to the firm's IPO month is 13.32%. The highest average initial return of 64.42% is experienced in the first quarter of year 2000. The mean leverage ratio for the sample firms is 0.37.
(ii) Methodology
Survival analysis is preferred over the conventional statistical methods (e.g., ordinary least square (OLS), binary dependent variable models etc.) due to a number of benefits. For example, OLS regression cannot handle the censored observations, which is a unique characteristic of survival data (Jenkins, 2005) . Censoring occurs when the event of interest (delisting of IPOs) has not yet occurred by the end of study or experiment. In our case, sample IPOs which are still trading (listed) by the end of December 2011 are right censored. Moreover, the binary dependent regression models (logit, probit etc.) do not take into account the timing of the events. On the other hand, survival analysis not only allows for censoring and different time horizons, it can also handle the time dependent variables.
The survival rates of the sample IPOs are estimated using the Kaplan-Meier (KM) method. The KM estimator is a non-parametric maximum likelihood method and is defined as (see Clark et al., 2003) 
Where S(t j ) is the probability of being listed at time (month) t j , S(t j−1 ) is the probability of being listed at time t j−1 , n j is the number of IPOs listed just before the time t j (also called risk set at t j ), d j is the number of IPOs delisted at time t j . We use log rank test for testing the statistical differences in KM survival curves between various groups (across issue years and industries) and sub-samples (lockup length). We also compare the median survival times across different groups and subsamples. Median survival time is the point in time at which survival probability is 0.5 (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2005) . Clark et al. (2003) state that median survival time is the widely used measure instead of mean as survival data are often skewed and rarely normally distributed. In the context of our analysis, median survival time is the time in months when cumulative survival rate for sample IPOs has dropped to 50% (i.e., half of the IPOs have been delisted). Following Espenlaub et al. (2012) , we use minimum survival time when the median survival time cannot be estimated (i.e., when cumulative survival rate stays above 50% by the end of study period).
We evaluate the suitability of survival models with constant hazard rates (semiparametric and non-parametric) and those models that allow the hazard to change over time (parametric) . Based on the unreported results of different graphical methods and tests, we find that the constant hazard assumption does not hold for our data and therefore parametric models are preferred. Our survival model is implemented in the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) form, which assumes that the effect of predictors is multiplicative on the survival time. The model is commonly expressed in log-linear form with respect to survival time as:
where β 0 , . . . , β p are parameters to be estimated, X 1 , . . . , X p are covariates, and ε j is the error term with a specific distributional form which determines the regression model. AFT models being the parametric models require specific underlying distribution (i.e., Weibull, Gamma, lognormal etc.). Unreported results for Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) identify lognormal as the most appropriate distribution with the lowest AIC value. 12 We estimate the following specific model where natural logarithm of the time to delist (survival time) is presented as a linear function of the covariates: 
Where Ln(T j ) is natural logarithm of time to delisting or survival time and covariates are as defined in Table 1 (Panel B) . Lockup Period is the length of lockup measured in months from date of IPO to lockup expiry date. Ln (Size) is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation of IPO at offering price in £millions. Ln (Age) is natural logarithm of the number of years between IPO date and the date the company was established. Initial Return is the difference of first day closing price and offer price as a percentage of offer price. Insider Ownership is the percentage of post-IPO equity retained by the firms' insiders. Sponsor Reputation for each sponsor is measured as the number of IPOs sponsored in the year prior to the IPO as a percentage of total IPOs in that year. PEVC is a dummy variable coded one for IPOs backed by PE or VC, and zero otherwise. Hot Issue Returns is a proxy for market hotness and is defined as the average of initial returns of all IPOs issued in the 3 months prior to the month of IPO. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities divided by the sum of total assets and IPO proceeds. We include dummies for industry sectors based on the FTSE Global Classification as outlined in Table 1 (Panel B) . 13 Size, age, leverage, industry and market conditions were identified in the previous literature as important for IPO survival. Large firms, for example, have less valuation uncertainty (Brav and Gompers, 2003) and better resources to cope with poor market conditions compared to the small IPOs (Hensler et al., 1997) . Larger IPOs, therefore, are likely to have better survival and probability of delisting is inversely related to the IPO size (Schultz, 1993) . Similarly, Schultz (1993) shows that probability of failure decreases with increasing age and Demers and Joos (2007) find that younger (less established) firms are more likely to fail. Industry effect on the performance and survival of IPOs has also been documented in the previous literature (Ritter, 1991; Hensler et al., 1997; Hamza and Kooli, 2010; Carpentier and Suret, 2011) . Hensler et al. (1997) , for example, observe shorter survival times for IPOs in computer, wholesale, restaurant and airline industries. Firms with higher levels of debt are more likely to accept mergers or being taken over in order to avoid bankruptcy (Loderer et al., 2009) . Consistent with these predictions, a number of studies have reported that IPO firms with higher leverage are more likely to delist (Demers and Joos, 2007; Bhattacharya et al., 2010) . Finally, previous evidence suggests a negative relationship between hot market periods and IPO survival (consistent with the window of opportunity theory, Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (2004) . We, therefore, control for the above variables when examining importance of lockups for the survival of IPO firms.
RESULTS
(i) Characteristics of Sample Firms and Lockups
In Table 3, Table 3 shows the types of lockup agreement between the firms' insiders and the underwriters at the time of IPO. We distinguish between lockups with absolute date expiry, relative date expiry and a combination of both types. The lockups in the case of absolute date expiry are set in terms of clear calendar dates or a certain period of time after the IPO and usually give the exact length of the lockup period. The relative date expiry lockups, on the other hand, specify the expiry in relation to some corporate events like preliminary results announcements or publication of company accounts etc.
14 The third type is a combination of the two lockup types (e.g., some directors have relative expiry and others have absolute expiry). The combinations also include cases of lockups with multiple expiry dates. 15 Panel B shows a clear break-point between the use of absolute and relative expiry lockups in pre-and post-year 2000. Firms in the 14 We first collect the type of relative event (corporate announcement) of relative date lockups from the IPO prospectus and then use Perfect Filings Database to find the exact date of that event to find the length of lockup period. 15 The staggered or lockups with multiple expiry dates could be specified in both absolute and relative lockups. An absolute date lockup with multiple expiry dates has been classified as an absolute lockup for the purposes of 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 ( respectively. However, the differences in survival rates across years are statistically insignificant. The survival rates across industries show relatively less variation with a minimum 5 year survival rate of 62% for Non-Cyclical Services. The Resources sector enjoys the highest 5 year survival rate of 76%. However, the differences in survival rates across industries are not statistically significant. The median survival time for our sample IPOs is 92 months (i.e., half of the IPOs survive for 92 months or less). The median survival time, however, varies substantially across the listing years. For example, the median survival time is lowest for IPOs issued in year 2001 and longest for firms listed in year 1991. The shortest longevity was reported for years 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006 . Comparison of the median survival time across industries shows that the "Resources" sector enjoys the highest survival time of 155 months while firms in "Non-Cyclical Services" have the lowest survival time of 79 months.
ii) Longevity and Survival Rates
Panel C of Table 4 shows the survival rates during the first 5 years after listing for the full sample. The first year survival rate for sample IPOs is 99% which falls to 69% after 5 years of listing. This translates into a 31% delisting rate after 5 years of IPO and is higher than the percentage of 20-28% for Europe's main market recently reported in Vismara et al. (2012) . The 31% delisting rate is, however, lower than 41% for AIM IPOs, reported in Espenlaub et al. (2012) . Table 5 breaks down the survival rates and time by different lockup lengths. In Panel A, we stratify results by lockup length (i.e., lockup period greater than the median and lockup period below the median length). The survival rates for 1, 3 and 5 years post-IPO are consistently higher for lockups greater than the median compared to the lockups lower than the median. For example, the 5 year survival rates for IPOs with lockups greater than median lockup are 72% compared to the 67% survival rate for IPOs with lockups lower than the median lockup length. The cumulative survival rates for firms with average lockup length above the median are higher in six out of nine industries. Overall, sample firms with a longer lockup period survive longer compared to their counterparts with the shorter lockups. Panel B provides survival rates and times of the full sample over three different lockup periods (i.e., up to 12 months, 13 
0.050
Note: This table shows the cumulative survival rates for 517 IPOs with lockups only calculated using the Kaplan Meier (KM) method for 1, 3 and 5 years after the IPO. Based on the survival rates, we also show the median survival times in months (Median ST). Median ST indicates the number of months after which half of the sample IPOs have been delisted (the cumulative survival rate has dropped below 50%). The survival rates and median survival times are reported by dividing the IPOs into below and above median lockup length across industry sectors (Panel A) and in Panel B for three different lockup lengths; 0-12 months, 13-24 months and greater than 24 months. Panel B also shows the results of log rank tests to assess the statistical significance of differences between survival curves across lockup lengths.
to 24 months, and lockups greater than 24 months). Similar to the results observed in Panel A, the survival rates are consistently higher for firms with longer lockup periods. For example, IPOs with lockups greater than 24 months experience higher 5 year survival rates comparedto the IPOs with 12 months lockups (77% vs. 67%). Firms going public with a lockup period of more than 24 months, add 52 months to their survival time compared to the survival time for firms with 12 months lockup. The log rank test for equality of survival rates rejects the null hypothesis of equal survival rates across the three lockup periods, at the 5% level of significance. Overall, results from Table 5 lend strong support to our hypothesis regarding importance of lockups' length for the IPO survival.
(iii) Delisting and Failure Rates
In Table 7 shows the failure rates across delisting reasons and lockup lengths. In Panel A, we report 1 year, 3 year and 5 year failure rates for IPOs with lockups above and below the median lockup length by different delisting reasons. Panel B shows the failure rates across different delisting types for three categories of lockup periods (up to 12 months, 13 to 24 months, and lockups greater than 24 months). The 1, 3 and 5 year post-IPO failure rates due to mergers and acquisitions are not much different across various lengths of lockup, although failure rates decrease with increase in the length of lockup. The most notable differences in failure rates, however, are observed for the more negative delisting reasons (i.e., administration/liquidations and other delisting). The failure rates for longer lengths of lockup are consistently lower than the failure rates for shorter lockups across the administration/liquidations and other delisting reasons. For example, none of the IPOs with lockups longer than 24 months were delisted due to administration/liquidations and other delisting reasons. These results provide further support to our conjecture that longer lockups signal quality and better survival prospects of the issuing firms.
(iv) Determinants of IPOs Survival
The estimation results from the AFT model are presented in Table 8 . We present both the coefficient estimates and the time ratios along with the associated p-values.
Table 6
Reasons for Delisting by Industry Table 7 Delisting ( Note: This table shows the estimation results of the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model. The lognormal density distribution was selected based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). All variables are defined in Table 1 . Time ratios are the exponentiated coefficients, exp (β), and measure the extent to which changes in covariates accelerate or decelerate the occurrence of event (delisting). A time ratio of above (below) one indicates that an increase in the covariate increases (reduces) the survival time. Pseudo R 2 was estimated as R 2 = 1 − Lu/Lo; where Lu corresponds to the last log-likelihood number before the convergence and Lo corresponds to the first log-likelihood number at the start of the iteration. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Overall, our model exhibits reasonable explanatory power, measured by pseudo R 2 and statistically significant likelihood ratio. The results show a positive impact of lockup period on the survival time. The coefficient on the lockup variable is positive and highly significant with a p-value of 0.006. The time ratio of 1.020 associated with the lockup period means that for a 1 month increase in lockup period, the survival time increases by a factor of 1.020 or by 2%. The results regarding IPO size and its impact on post-IPO survival are in line with our expectations and suggest that larger IPOs are more likely to survive longer and have higher survival rates. We find a beneficial but small effect of size on the aftermarket survival in line with the widely documented size effect in earlier studies (Ritter, 1991; Schultz, 1993 ). An increase of 1% in the size of IPO increases the survival time by 0.1%. 17 Age of the IPO firm has a positive and significant impact on the survival. For example, post-issue survival time increases by 0.12% for a 1% increase in the age of firm. The statistically insignificant and small coefficient on initial returns shows no effect of initial returns on survival of IPOs. Higher ownership retention by the insiders positively affects the survival of IPOs. However, the coefficient is weakly statistically significant with a small effect on survival (e.g., 1% increase in the insider ownership increases the survival time by 0.4%). Contrary to Bhattacharya et al. (2013) and Espenlaub et al. (2012) , we find an insignificant effect of sponsor reputation on survival. The coefficient of hot issue returns is negative (as expected) and statistically significant. The survival time decreases by 0.8% for a 1% increase in hot issue returns. The negative relationship between hot market proxy and IPO survival is consistent with Espenlaub et al. (2012) , who find that IPOs issued during hot periods in UK market have significantly reduced survival times. Our results also provide support to the argument that poor quality firms take advantage of market sentiment and go public during hot periods in the UK (Coakley et al., 2007) . Moreover, Yung et al. (2008) report that US firms going public in hot markets are much more likely to delist within 3 years than those in cold markets. The results also show a negative but statistically insignificant effect of leverage on IPO survival. We find that backing by PE or VC firms significantly reduces the survival time of the issuing firms. The estimated time ratio for the variable PEVC is 0.826 which indicates that the survival time for IPOs backed by PE or VC reduces by 17.4% compared to IPOs without PE backing.
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Our results are in line with the finding of Kooli and Meknassi (2007) and Vismara et al. (2012) , who show that PE backed firms have a higher probability of being acquired and delisted.
19 PE backed sample firms may be more attractive to potential acquirers due to the positive impact of PE or VC backing. An alternate explanation could be the short-term focus and/or grandstanding of PE firms (Gompers, 1996) . For example, Jelic (2011) shows that a significant number of PE backed buy-outs exit early in the AIM market. Finally, we find a positive and significant (although weak) industry effect on survival time of issuing firms. IPO firms from the Resources sector have much higher survival probability compared to the firms in Non-Cyclical Services.
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The results about significant industry effects are consistent with the findings reported for US IPOs in Hensler et al.(1997) .
We further perform a sensitivity analysis of the predicted median survival time in response to changes in lockup period based on the coefficient estimates from Table 8 . The results of the sensitivity or simulations of the survival time are reported in Table 9 . The table shows the expected survival time, absolute change in months and the percentage change in expected survival time when the median lockup period changes first by 1 month and then by quarterly intervals up to 12 months. We first evaluate the predicted survival time at median (13 months) of lockup and means of all other variables. The predicted median survival time equals 89 months.
The results show a significant impact of increase in lockup period on the survival time. An increase of 12 months in the median lockup length causes an increase of 24 months in the post-IPO survival time (median survival time increases from 89 to 
(i) Constant Hazard, Heterogeneity and Clustering
We re-estimate our AFT model with frailty which is introduced as an unobservable multiplicative effect. The introduction of frailty in the survival model takes into account the fact that all the issuing firms in our sample might not be homogenous in terms of their delisting hazard (see Jenkins, 2005) . The (unreported) results were economically and statistically similar to our earlier results in Table 8 (i.e., without frailty). 22 We also consider our results adjusting for clustering standard errors since we have high number of IPOs in some of the sample years. Again our results remain robust to clustering based on IPO frequency in different years.
23
In order to check the robustness of our results to the choice of different survival estimation models, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model with the same covariates. The Cox model makes no assumption about the underlying statistical distribution and the baseline hazard function is estimated non-parametrically. Table 10 shows that our main results remain robust. The only exception is the insider ownership variable and Resources sector which are no more statistically significant.
(ii) Regulatory Changes
Firms in certain industry sectors were required to have compulsory lockups for listing on LSE prior to year 2000. For example, directors and other senior employees of 21 We obtain even more striking results when mean (instead of median) of the lockup period is used in the analysis. The results are available upon request from authors. 22 The p-value for the likelihood ratio test of H 0 : θ = 0 is 0.145, where θ is the frailty parameter. 23 The unreported results are available upon request from the authors. Table 1 . The hazard ratio is calculated as the exponential of coefficient estimate, exp (β). A hazard ratio of above (below) one indicates that increase in the explanatory variable increases (reduces) the failure rate. Pseudo R 2 was estimated as R 2 = 1 − Lu/Lo; where Lu corresponds to the last log-likelihood number before the convergence and Lo corresponds to the first log-likelihood number at the start of the iteration. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
mineral companies with less than 3 years of trading history were subject to compulsory lockups for 2 years after the IPO. Similar restrictions were applicable to scientific research based companies between years 1993 and 2000. Lockups have not been obligatory for these companies since January 2000 but they have to include a statement in their prospectus about lockups. 24 We, therefore, test for robustness of our results to the institutional changes in lockup requirements. First, we exclude mineral and scientific research based companies floated before year 2000 from our sample. Second, we exclude all companies with exactly 2 years of lockups from our sample. Unreported results show that the main inferences are robust to excluding both types of sample firms.
(iii) Alternative Measures of Explanatory Variables
We also check the robustness of results to different measurements and definitions of some of the explanatory variables. For example, we use different variations of our proxy for measuring sponsor reputation. First, we employ a measure of sponsor reputation similar to the one used by Jelic (2011) for PE firm reputation. The sponsor reputation is calculated as an equally weighted average of rank scores based on (i) the number of IPOs sponsored, and (ii) the amount sponsored in £ millions during the sample period as a lead sponsor. Sponsor Reputation is a dummy variable coded one for IPOs sponsored by the Top10 sponsors, and zero otherwise. Finally, we follow the sponsor reputation measure used by Derrien and Kecskés (2007) for the UK market.
25 Our (unreported) results are economically and statistically robust to alternative measures of sponsors' reputation.
CONCLUSION
Using a sample of 580 IPOs from 1990-2006, we examine the overall survival rates (and times), delisting reasons and determinants of IPO survival focusing on lockup length. Five year survival rate for our sample IPOs is 69% and the median survival time over the entire sample period (1990-2011) is 92 months. The reported 31% delisting rate, during the 5-year period after listing, is higher than reported for other European markets (see Vismara et al., 2012) . M&As account for one quarter, whilst failures (administration, liquidations, receivership, and cancellations) account for only 6% of all delistings in the first 5-year period. The failure rates for longer lengths of lockup are consistently lower than the failure rates for shorter lockups regardless of delisting reasons. Notably, none of the sample IPOs with lockups longer than 24 months delisted due to administration/liquidations. Furthermore, firms going public with a lockup period of more than 24 months, add 52 months to their median survival time relative to the survival time of their counterparts with 12 months lockups.
We provide empirical evidence that locking-in inside managers for longer periods improves the long-term survival of IPO firms. A 12 month increase in median lockup period increases the (median) survival time by 27%. The results are robust to different survival estimation models, heterogeneity, clustering and alternative specification of variables. The above results inform the recent debate about the alleged short-termism of the UK equity market by lending support to recent recommendations which suggest that directors' remuneration should be based on long-term performance and provided in the form of company shares to be held (locked-in) for a much longer period of time (Kay, 2012; BBC, 2013; Deloitte, 2013) .
Our results have important implications for IPO firms, investors and regulators. Issuing firms for example, can signal long-term survival prospects through length of lockups. Lockups' characteristics thus can help investors assessing IPOs' quality. Regulators and policymakers concerned about the short-termism of equity markets may consider longer lockups as a means to align managers' interests with those of investors in the long run.
Table A1
Correlation Matrix 
Note:
This table provides correlation coefficients across the variables used in regression model specified in equation (3). All variables are defined in Table 1 (Panel B) .
